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“THE LATTER TEND ALSO TO BE THE FORMER”
Gray, Colin S. National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2009. 334pp. $29.95

Colin Gray’s highly engaging book addresses a spectrum of national security
considerations that are likely to impact
the United States in the coming years.
Gray, who is a professor at the University of Reading and served for five years
in the Ronald Reagan administration,
argues that America’s sports-mindedness
has culturally prepared Americans to
think in terms of winning and losing
and of confrontations that have a beginning, middle, and end. In this light,
the former expression of art “Global
War on Terrorism,” one that President
Obama has dispensed with, leads us to
overlook the eternal nature of the struggle against individual and small-group
violence. Gray convincingly observes
that the conflict the United States has
embarked upon after September 11
“bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most
people understandably call a war.”
Gray warns that although we cannot
control surprise, we can control our reaction to it—a particularly important
observation for the current geostrategic
environment. His call for the United
States to develop a “detailed, culturally
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empathetic understanding of its new
adversaries” is particularly apt. One is
left with the task of struggling to choose
which arguments should be highlighted.
Even the chapter on understanding revolutionary changes in warfare, a topic
that received too much attention after
the 1991 Persian Gulf war, is rewarding.
Gray points out that though the term is
of use, one cannot assess the true nature
of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) outside the wider political,
strategic, and social context. For example, Germany’s successes in May 1940
were due as much to French mistakes as
to Nazi military innovation.
In addition, at a number of points
throughout the book Gray makes the
cogent point that the United States
could easily spend too much time looking for, or attempting to create, the
next RMA and put too little effort into
understanding social and cultural
changes in how it views war. I believe
Gray coined the term “Revolution in
Attitudes toward the Military” to argue
that variations in acceptable military
practices and the need to understand
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the cultural implications of violence
will be increasingly important.
I would offer two minor critiques. Gray
may have set the bar too high when he
argues at length that the United States
suffers “a persistent strategy deficit.”
Doesn’t history offer more than a handful of examples of powerful states that
demonstrated superb long-range strategic planning, in particular during
peacetime? I wonder if one can agree
with the great majority of Gray’s individual critiques on American strategic
practices and yet be skeptical that a
broad-gauge indictment is warranted.
Also, when I read the brief section in
which he argues that al-Qa‘ida could
potentially be deterred, I remained unconvinced. The facts that al-Qa‘ida protects its key members and that some of
the organization’s support system may
be deterrable are far from demonstrating that “the organization itself . . .
should be eminently deterrable.” However, these are two minor points regarding a commendable work that engages a
wide array of security considerations
and offers much engaging and original
thinking.
As Gray notes regarding his subtitle,
“the latter tend also to be the former.”
Colin Gray’s work offers many important arguments and observations that
will help identify both.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

Stuart, Douglas T. Creating the National Security
State: A History of the Law That Transformed
America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
2008. 342pp. $38.50

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/9

Douglas Stuart holds the J. William
Stuart and Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies, Business and
Management at Dickinson College and
is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army
War College. He provides an insightful
history of the struggle to reform completely the U.S. national security establishment from 1937 to 1960, an effort
that resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and three
separate armed service departments under a secretary of defense.
This extensively researched study of the
political and bureaucratic battles to establish control over the national security establishment holds invaluable
lessons for those interested in the current efforts to reform the joint, interagency system to better develop,
resource, and execute a coherent national security policy and strategy.
Prior to World War II, Edward
Pendleton Herring of Harvard identified problems with the existing foreign
and defense policy-making system. The
United States was wedded to isolationism and antimilitarism, with narrow
domestic political interests that shaped
its foreign and defense policies.
Pendleton Herring introduced the
“concept of national security” and was
visionary in proposing an alternative
national security system. Pearl Harbor
quickly changed the way Americans
thought about security. The fact that
the United States was attacked from
such distance firmly “established the
concept of national security as an unchallengeable standard against which all
future foreign policy decisions were to
be made.”
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Stuart describes the significant roles
played by presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower; secretaries of state George
Marshall and Dean Acheson; Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal; Congressman Carl Vinson; policy adviser
Ferdinand Eberstadt; and Pendleton
Herring. He explains how national security was managed during the war,
how the Joint Chiefs’ power grew, the
marginalization of the State Department, and the lessons learned. There is
also a discussion of the unsuccessful efforts made by Truman, Marshall, and
the Army leadership to unify the services. Forrestal and the Navy opposed
unification, proposing an alternative
national security system developed by
the Unification Study Group, chaired
by Eberstadt, with Pendleton Herring’s
participation. The bureaucratic battles
lasted over three years and resulted in
the 1947 National Security Act, which
created a National Military Establishment, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, secretary of
defense, Air Force, and three other institutions that soon disappeared. Stuart
identifies this system’s severe flaws, especially the limited powers granted to
the secretary of defense and the statutory membership of the three services
in the NSC with the secretary of defense. In 1949, 1958, and with Eisenhower’s reorganization plan of 1953,
these flaws were rectified. There follows
a discussion of the reasons for this final
transition from a National Military Establishment to a Department of Defense
and the creation of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, with the three services removed from the NSC, becoming
now departments under the defense
secretary. Stuart’s lucid analysis of
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lessons learned is a must-read for future
reform efforts.
RICHMOND M. LLOYD

Naval War College

Tangredi, Sam J. Futures of War: Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment,
2010–2035. Newport, R.I.: Alidade, 2008. 273pp.
$20

What Sam Tangredi offers here is not a
standard attempt at predicting the near
future of warfare but rather a synthesis
of various competing predictions and
analyses.
The book is a follow-up to his earlier
book All Possible Wars (2004), the object of which was to inform political decision making in the realm of defense
planning. One hopes that this latest effort does not follow the fate of its predecessor, which Tangredi freely admits
remained largely ignored by its target
audience.
A “reinvestigation and rewrite rather
than a revision,” the work has as its explicitly stated purpose “to provide—not
an independent forecast—but a comparative analysis of current studies of
the future security environment in order to support upcoming reviews of
America’s defense posture.”
Methodologically speaking, the work is
comprehensive, drawing from forty different studies. Each study is rigorously
surveyed, analyzed, and compared with
others for points of agreement and
dissention. Points of consensus and divergence are tested against the sources
to distinguish dissenting positions from
points of consensus and to validate
consensus as a majority view.
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This methodology, “Representative
Source Comparative Analysis” (RSCA),
identifies threats, conflicts, and drivers, the latter incorporating ideologies,
economic factors, and technology.
The sources are, like this study,
authoritative.
Chapter 5 contains the bulk of the work
by identifying “common assessments
and consensus.” Dividing the analysis
into categories of threats, military technology, and opposing strategies, which
are then subdivided into eighteen
subscenarios, Tangredi makes an effective comprehensive and succinct examination of the literature to provide a
review of the various studies in each
case, explaining what arises in consensus and in opposition.
The intention of chapter 6, “Divergence
and Contradictions,” is to capture the
essence of basic divergent views and examines ten “either-or” propositions. In
this instance, these are broken into various category headings, such as nature of
conflict (which replaces military technology), threats, and opposing strategies. The chapter is simple, clear, to the
point, and—although the substance is
more complicated than the author represents it to be—credible.
In chapter 7, “Wild Cards and Hedging
Scenarios,” touching on the bane of defense planners everywhere, the book inevitably loses some of its certainty—a
point not lost on Tangredi. Yet he cleverly utilizes the “wild card” and the
“hedging scenario” to provide a conceptual overlay that, he argues, enables
the assessment of an adopted defense
policy’s flexibility and baseline
assumptions.
One caveat is, naturally, that in dealing
with this subject, what was once the
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future quickly becomes the past. This is
the case, for example, regarding wildcard scenarios, where a global economic
collapse is discussed. This has arguably
happened since publication.
Futures of War is certainly worthy of the
attention of U.S. defense policy makers,
but it is impossible to know if this work
will follow its predecessor and be ignored as well.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN

Deputy Director, Centre for Security Studies
University of Hull

Graham, Gordon. Ethics and International Relations. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell,
2008. 223pp. $21.95

In today’s world, citizens, statesmen,
and men and women in uniform are
faced almost daily with real questions
about terrorism, torture, humanitarian
intervention, and foreign assistance.
They must return again and again to
the problem of determining when the
use of military force might be an appropriate response to the horrors of the
day. For these individuals Gordon Graham’s Ethics and International Relations
is an invaluable work. It is stimulating,
challenging, insightful, and, perhaps
most unusually, helpful. Not by any
stretch of the imagination is this a
“how-to” book, with explicit guidance
or facile answers. Rather, it represents
an understanding of the contending
logics that lead to competing conclusions about right or wrong action, or
nonaction, on the global stage.
Graham, a distinguished philosopher
now holding the Henry Luce III Chair
at the Princeton Theological Seminary,
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updates and expands here his original
1997 publication, tackling issues that
have emerged in the last decade. This
revised work retains the extraordinary
merits of the earlier. The author brings
wonderful clarity of logic and presentation to what, in other hands, is often a
confused mess of unconnected arguments, claims, counterarguments, and
counterclaims. Graham offers his presentation without disparaging or giving
short shrift to anyone, exploring realist,
various moralist, and what he terms
“Legalist” traditions of international
ethics, the assumptions and reasoning
built into them, the criticisms that have
been leveled against them, and possible
responses to these criticisms.
Graham himself is neither, on the one
hand, utopian nor, on the other hand,
dismissive of ethical concerns. In the
“Legalist” tradition, Graham stresses
the moral disanalogies between states
and individuals (a difference that “Moralist” approaches often regard as unimportant), argues the need to consider
both natural law and the law of nations
in wrestling with international ethics,
and uses the just-war theory as a logical
starting place for consideration of other
interventions. Graham is candid and
thoughtful about the problems of such
an approach, as well as about the
strengths of alternatives.
While this volume is a tightly integrated
whole, it is organized into what are essentially eight separate, carefully organized, and self-contained twenty-fivepage lectures. Beginning with the rise of
the state system and of the nation-state,
Graham investigates the ethical assumptions built into this political
framework and the challenges inherent
in such an organization of political life.
He explores just-war theory and
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considers the ethical problems associated with weapons of mass destruction
before turning to the issues that have
increasingly dominated the international agenda of the post–Cold War
period.
Among the joys of this wonderfully erudite but never overwhelming or condescending volume is Graham’s capacity
to explain, without going off on tangents, many of the concepts and distinctions—from the differences
between power and authority and between force and violence to the logic of
the principle of double effect—that, left
unexplained, befuddle so many analyses
and discussions.
Readers are likely to realize many
“aha!” moments as all sorts of nonsensical arguments suddenly make sense.
Surprisingly, given the weightiness of
the topic, this is a book that is difficult
to put down and an important book to
pick up.
EDWARD RHODES

Rutgers University

Kets de Vries, Manfred F. R. Reflections on Character and Leadership: On the Couch with Manfred
Kets de Vries. New York: Wiley, 2009. 332pp.
$29.95

Reflections on Character and Leadership
is not your typical book on leadership.
It delves into aspects that are often neglected in both the classroom and professional press. How often do we focus
on the leader who is dysfunctional and
on what drives the destructiveness?
This is what Manfred Kets de Vries has
set out to do. An engaging writer and
scholar with a penchant for practical
workplace applications, Kets de Vries
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has taught at Harvard and is currently
the Clinical Professor of Leadership at
INSEAD in Paris, one of the world’s
leading and largest business schools.
His background in economics, psychoanalysis, and organization research
gives a holistic perspective to the material, including his recommendations for
intervention.
The author opens by describing troubled entrepreneurs and analyzing the
psychology of dysfunctional leaders.
The examples are vivid and instructive.
As individuals gain recognition, authority, and power, eventually they arrive at
a fork in the road. One path commits
them to serve for the greater good,
while the other leads down the dark
lane of hubris and malevolence. Kets de
Vries then discusses how this choice can
affect organizations and proposes
possible remedial actions.
One reason the “dark side” of leadership is underrepresented in literature is
that the genesis of a pathology is not
readily assessable. Research cannot directly validate the developmental or
emotional voids that lead to paradoxical behavior in the executive ranks. Unfortunately, organizations often reward
personality defects and encourage the
wrong role models. For example, while
charismatic aggressiveness is often
viewed as a positive leadership trait, it
can also be compensatory cover for insecurity or paranoia, for which the
organization will pay a price.
Kets de Vries draws on his clinical and
psychoanalytic research to identify
these pathologies and their consequences, which are frequently substantial. Arrogance, power, and a tendency
to distort reality can result in oppressive micromanagement, a toxic
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workplace, and insidiously faulty decisions. In this day and age, we do not
have to look far to find examples.
When confronted with pathological
leadership, followers have three options: flight, fight, or dependency. The
author discusses the strong symbiotic
dynamics between a corrosive leader
and dependent followers. Subconscious
identification with such a leader gives
followers the illusion of control, protection, and purpose. It is a regressive way
for followers to cope with anxiety and
fear, and it is fertile ground for
ideological manipulation.
The book concludes with a discussion
of transformational leadership and the
challenges confronting global organizations. Here Kets de Vries brings to bear
his international leadership-forum experience, stressing the necessity of interpersonal and cultural acumen and of
appropriate organizational structures.
This section contains an intriguing
analysis of how Russian leadership
behavior and thinking has been influenced by that nation’s unique culture.
Reflections on Character and Leadership
is the first of a planned three-volume
series. It suffers from a few irritants that
haunt collected works, such as dated
material, repetition, and unevenness.
However, the convenience and enjoyment of reading a range of material
from this influential and gifted writer
more than compensate for any
transgressions.
HANK KNISKERN

Naval War College
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Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: My
Years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
549pp. $30

George Tenet’s tenure as Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) was marked
throughout by controversy, so it is no
surprise that his memoirs face more of
the same. Partisans will never be satisfied; policy and national security insiders, regardless of their depth on the
inside, will find areas with which to disagree; historians will decry the lack of
citations; and individuals who helped to
create some of that history will be glad
for that lack.
Yet for readers not looking for confirmation of their prejudices, At the Center
of the Storm will provide an engrossing
narrative of a critical time in U.S. history. This much cannot be contested:
George Tenet was a key player during a
period that reshaped this nation. Was
he the best possible choice? Some will
argue that he was not, while others who
look back at the history of the CIA during the 1980s and 1990s will be grateful
for his tenure.
At the Center of the Storm is above all a
story of love and passion, for Tenet is
not a cold chronicler who hides his
emotions behind a detached, simple
narrative of events. As Virgil writes, “I
sing of arms and the man,” so does
Tenet. Just as his love for his country
and for his family shines throughout
this work, so does his love for the CIA
and its officers. This book reads as a
first-person history should. It is engrossing and fascinating, with the personal view of “this is what we were
trying to do.”
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Tenet’s strengths were as a leader and
visionary, strengths that civilian agencies, unlike the military, rarely have the
pleasure to experience. Tenet took over
the agency during a time of demoralization and became its greatest champion,
cheerleader, and advocate. If he was not
as successful within the larger intelligence community, it was not for lack of
effort.
Tenet’s appointment showed both the
advantages and disadvantages of having
an intelligence outsider at the helm of
the CIA. As an outsider, he was willing
to challenge the old ways of doing
things that any bureaucracy develops
over time. Changing from a Cold War
world to a multipolar world required a
new perspective to meet new threats
and challenges. But outsiders cannot always recognize the nuances of the intelligence craft (whether operational or
analytic) and risk losing the balance
necessary for producing good intelligence. The reader can decide where
events like the now-infamous
“slam-dunk” incident belong.
Decades from now, historians likely
with no better knowledge than we have
will write an objective account of DCI
George Tenet. If there is a degree of justice in the world, Tenet will be rightfully acknowledged as one of the
greatest DCIs in history. If these historians are faithful to their craft, however,
they will also point out that George
Tenet, like all great men, had an element of hubris that in the end tarnished
his record.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia
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Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexandre SheldonDuplaix. Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold
War Naval Espionage. New York: Wiley, 2009.
414pp. $30

Contrary to the popular notions of spying as conveyed in novels and films, espionage is a difficult and frequently
dangerous business. Although everyone
does it, some nations are just better at
it. In this work, Peter A. Huchthausen
and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix offer a
series of accounts of naval espionage
after World War II.
While this reviewer cannot attest to the
bona fides of Sheldon-Duplaix, I do
know that Huchthausen was the consummate insider in naval intelligence,
having had a diverse career during
which he always seemed to be in the
middle of the action. His specialty was
in human-source intelligence, with a
primary focus on the Soviet Union and
its navy. Sadly, Peter died in July 2008,
before the formal release of this book,
so it seems somewhat unfair to critique
his work.
To be of value to other than casual
readers, a book on Cold War naval espionage should first describe the national
security context to explain why these
intelligence activities were undertaken
in the first place and what bits of
knowledge were so important that they
required such great risk. Second, it
should ask, what did naval espionage do
to obtain the information, and what
contributions did naval intelligence offer to the problem? What did naval
intelligence add to the body of knowledge? Against this paradigm, Hide and
Seek falls short of the mark.
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The early chapters provide an interesting account of the competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union
to obtain German technology immediately after World War II. The authors
go on to discuss the early stages of the
Cold War, culminating with the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962. Although there
are numerous references to archival historical material, books, and personal
correspondence, Huchthausen and
Sheldon-Duplaix largely rely on anecdotes (we call them “sea stories” in the
Navy), loosely strung together, and offer few conclusions. For example, one is
left wondering why the Royal Navy
would risk the life of the World War II
hero, frogman, and MI6 diver Lionel
Crabb in a seemingly failed effort to
conduct underhull reconnaissance of an
aging Soviet warship.
While some insights are provided into
naval intelligence activities during the
Cold War, especially the Cuban missile
crisis, no description is offered of the
enormous contributions of naval intelligence and its operations to the redefinition of the U.S. Navy’s maritime
strategy in the 1980s, which focused on
holding at risk the Soviet ballisticmissile submarine force.
Extensively covered is Project JENNIFER,
the joint CIA-Navy venture to recover
the lost Soviet Golf II ballistic-missile
submarine from the depths of the
northern Pacific Ocean in 1974. The
authors’ unique contribution is a
lengthy description of the efforts taken
by the United States to provide the lost
Soviet submariners dignified burials at
sea when the submarine was recovered—an event that was videotaped and
years later handed over to the Russians.
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Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix also
examine a number of counterintelligence issues, such as the 1961 Christine
Keeler affair in Britain and, more important, the treason of John Walker,
who spied for the Soviets from 1967 to
the mid-1980s and whom the authors
describe as “one of the greatest espionage successes in history.”
Two concluding chapters introduce orthogonal themes, such as the 1980s Soviet operations that culminated in the
“Whiskey on the Rocks” (a euphemism
for the grounding of a Soviet submarine
in Swedish territorial waters) and a bizarre account of how UFOs might have
altered the strategic balance during the
Cold War.
Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix offer an interesting and entertaining read,
one that shows that U.S. naval attachés
at times work in difficult and dangerous
circumstances. However, because of its
excessive use of anecdotes, this book
does not add much to the body of
knowledge about naval espionage—neither that of the United States, of the Soviets, or of anyone else.
JEROME J. BURKE

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Washington, D.C.

Rhys-Jones, Graham. Churchill and the Norway
Campaign. South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and
Sword, 2008. 223pp. $33

“The principle of aiming everything at
the enemy’s center of gravity admits of
only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally
rewarding.” This classic dictum, given
to us by the great military theorist Carl
von Clausewitz, provides the impetus
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behind this book. Originally conceived
as a case study for inclusion in the
Strategy and Policy curriculum at the
U.S. Naval War College, this historical
work covers the operations in Norway
during the spring of 1940, one of the
most overlooked campaigns of the Second World War. The reader is presented with a complete account, in a
fast-moving and easy format, of the
strategic decision making that eventually led both Great Britain and France,
on the one side, and Germany, on the
other, to conclude that opening a new
theater in Norway could in fact be
“exceptionally rewarding.”
While Churchill figures prominently in
the book’s title, the reader will find examined not only his policy decisions
and strategic ideas discussed at length
but also the actions and decisions of
numerous other participants in the governments of the major belligerents.
Most studies concerning the war in the
West in 1940 focus on the French military’s epic defeat, but Rhys-Jones offers
an account of French participation in
the war as Great Britain’s strategic partner. The strategic partnership between
the Neville Chamberlain and Édouard
Daladier governments in the spring of
1940 is a subject that usually does not
get much attention, but an interesting
account of that short-lived alliance can
be found in this book.
Rhys-Jones, a former member of the
Naval War College faculty, presents his
analysis in a manner that both students
and faculty at the college will find familiar. He begins at the policy level, focusing on the benefits and drawbacks
that each major participant concludes
are relevant to undertaking operations
in what was considered a secondary theater. He then outlines each belligerent’s
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strategy before presenting a thorough
examination of operations and tactical
considerations for both land and maritime forces involved in the campaign.
The outcome in Norway was never a
foregone conclusion. Germany’s tactical
prowess and brilliant leadership at the
small-unit level are conveyed nicely,
leaving the reader to actually wonder
throughout the narrative whether the
Germans can pull off such a bold and
daring feat of arms.
It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones’s authoritative approach to the subject matter and
his fine writing style that he has created
such a useful study of the elements—
the matching of strategy and policy, the
conduct of joint operations, and the
wisdom of opening a new theater—
while at the same time telling a riveting
story.
Any student of grand strategy, as well as
the casual reader, will find plenty of
value in this well written historical narrative. If there is a waiting list of books
to be included into the curriculum at
the Naval War College, this book
should top the list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General
Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the
Japanese Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 296pp. $32.95

Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such
as Richard Pearl, have long argued that
these treaties make a nation weaker by
depriving it of the means of self-defense.
John Kuehn, former naval aviator and
presently professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and
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General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this
excellent book. He shows how the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze
battleship construction and yet made
the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While
it is never easy to prove something so
counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands
down.
How did this happen? First, by freezing
the building of battleships the treaty
drove the Navy to invest more time,
money, and imagination into other
projects, particularly submarines and
aircraft carriers. These ships had greater
potential than the battleship, which had
just about reached its maximum technology by the end of World War I. In
addition, by preventing the United
States from enhancing its base fortifications west of Hawaii, the treaty drove
the Navy to design new vessels of much
greater operational radius, build floating dry docks, and enhance its total
transport capabilities. By World War II,
the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly
impossible: beat a peer competitor in
the western Pacific without permanent
bases in the area of operations.
One wonders why the Japanese did not
take advantage of the constraints imposed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn
offers a convincing explanation, by focusing on the General Board of the U.S.
Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal
and faction ridden, the U.S. General
Board was collegial, collaborative, and
remarkably open to new ideas from all
branches of the service, virtually irrespective of rank. Both the British and
the Japanese fell far behind in antisubmarine warfare. The Japanese stuck to
their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval
battle conducted by large battleships.
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The Americans, meanwhile, built a
more balanced fleet, able to starve Japan of supplies as well as defeat its
forces on land, in the air, and beneath
the sea.
When Kuehn writes of being collegial
and collaborative, this reviewer thought
of a perpetuation of the status quo,
since I was of the opinion that military
innovation is only the by-product of
egotistic individuals who are unable get
along with their fellow officers. Billy
Mitchell, J. F. C. Fuller, George Patton,
and Pete Ellis readily come to mind.
Kuehn points out yet another irony as
well—that the U.S. Navy of the 1920s
thrived because of financial constraints.
All naval officers with pulses and open
eyes could see that they could no longer
rely on their navy’s simply being bigger
than its prospective opponents. Hence
the institution entertained all serious
ideas of reform, so that the rebels, so to
speak, became the norm.
Although this is an excellent book, it is
not perfect. The discussion of flyingdeck cruisers (a model never put into
production) is too long. Chapter 8,
however, which compares innovation
or lack of it in the navies of Britain, Japan, and Germany, is about the best
writing I have seen on military development in the interwar years.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)

Kozak, Warren. LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay. Washington, D.C.: Regnery,
2009. 434pp. $27.95
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Warren Kozak captures the true essence
of General Curtis LeMay. Like many
great leaders, LeMay was a paradox, a
vivid contrast of unique strengths and
debilitating weaknesses. He was insecure, afraid of failure, always questioning his own decisions. LeMay hid his
insecurities beneath a stern and gruff
demeanor that gave the impression of
confidence and strength. The antithesis
of the stereotypical dashing American
flyboy, “LeMay was dark, brooding, and
forbidding. He rarely smiled, he spoke
even less, and when he did, his words
came out in a snarl.”
Always seeking to learn as much as he
could, LeMay not only flew airplanes
but took time to service and repair
them alongside his maintenance crew.
He made himself the best navigator in
the U.S. Army Air Corps. For example,
he successfully located the USS Utah in
a 120,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, and he found the Italian ocean
liner SS Rex in a large Atlantic storm.
As the United States entered World
War II LeMay commanded the 305th
Bomber Group, which began with only
three aircraft to train thirty-five crews.
He was a stern disciplinarian who
demanded excellence.
LeMay was always able to cut to the
heart of the matter. He devised radically
new tactics that improved bombing accuracy and reduced aircraft losses. To
build trust and confidence within his
crew, he led the missions himself. His
success was noticed, and as Generals
Hap Arnold’s and Ira Eaker’s “fireman”
he was given the toughest challenges to
overcome.
Kozak goes on to describe LeMay’s development of Strategic Air Command
(SAC), which supported his long-held
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vision that the best way to avoid war
was through strength and readiness, as
reflected in SAC’s motto: “Peace Is Our
Profession.” LeMay felt he was one of
the few people who understood that the
United States was at war with the Soviet
Union and that the only way SAC could
provide the security that the nation
needed was to be prepared to go to nuclear war at a moment’s notice. Everything he did was focused on that
objective.
After relinquishing command at SAC,
LeMay served as the U.S. Air Force’s
vice chief of staff and then chief of staff
during the Dwight D. Eisenhower, John
F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations. In the later years, LeMay
worked for Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, who, ironically, had once
worked for LeMay as a targeting analyst. The relationship between these two
men was often confrontational, but despite their differences McNamara called
LeMay “the finest military strategist this
nation ever produced.”
The last major chapter in LeMay’s life is
the one probably best remembered and
yet least reflective of LeMay’s internal
values. LeMay’s decision to run for vice
president on the Independent ticket
with Alabama’s Governor George
Wallace confounded everyone, including his own wife, daughter, and closest
associates. Kozak maintains there is no
evidence of LeMay being a racist and
maintains that the only reason he chose
to run was to split the vote, ensuring
that Democratic presidential candidate,
Hubert Humphrey, would not win the
election and so continue the policies of
the Johnson administration. By running, LeMay believed, he was taking
“one last chance to rise up and do battle” against the “defense intellectuals,”
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whom he believed would cut the U.S.
deterrent until the Soviets could win a
general war.
This book’s greatest value might be that
it offers an opportunity to consider objectively the impact that Curtis E.
LeMay (the youngest general in modern
American history and its longest serving) had on the events that shaped this
nation for many years to come.
ROGER DUCEY

Naval War College

Willmott, H. P. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2008. 520pp. $17.60

The Great Crusade is a comprehensive
military history of World War II. With a
focus on strategic-level military operations and a global perspective, this work
provides a particularly complete and nationally balanced account of the war. H.
P. Willmott achieves his ambitious goal
of providing “a basic reference and guide
to the war” that offers balance among
the major fronts of the conflict and illuminates “why events unfolded in the
manner in which they did.”
The Great Crusade discusses conflict
between countries and systems, not
between leaders or equipment. It is
about “how states make war and the basis on which services planned, executed
and either won or lost campaigns.”
Willmott distinguishes between the use
of available forces by military commanders to win campaigns and the use
of national power to win wars. National
and international political factors, beginning in 1931, get the attention they
deserve. How and why countries joined
and left the conflict (including the
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lesser Axis members) is presented in
context but without excess sympathy.
The ideology and associated atrocities
of Germany and Japan strengthened
morale at home and intimidated some,
but brutality prevented any prospect of
willing economic or military support
from conquered areas, particularly
China and the non-Russian parts of the
Soviet Union. The failure of the German and Japanese governments to mobilize their economies effectively when
at war contrasts with efforts by the key
Allied powers.
Willmott argues convincingly against numerous popular ideas concerning the war.
He attacks the “myth of German military
excellence,” offering numerous examples
of error and failure in military efforts and
in related economic and political activities. He highlights the paramount importance of the Russian front, covering the
enormous scale of combat and the tremendous improvement in Soviet military
strategic and operational skill.
This work is rich with comparisons between campaigns, strategies, and countries, and it covers land, sea, and air
operations with good balance. Numerous statistics illustrate key ideas and
strengthen the historical narrative. Dozens of maps help illustrate key campaigns. Also, the general index is useful.
Corrections to page numbers in the
“Campaign Index” planned for the second printing will make this book invaluable. The bibliography organizes
suggestions into fourteen categories
that reflect regions or themes in a way
that may compensate for the absence of
citations.
Willmott’s impressive credentials include faculty experience at several universities and at the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst. He has written
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nineteen books and coauthored several
others. He is a fellow of the Royal
Historical Society.
Because this work is “a general overview
of military events” with some emphasis
on correcting popular misunderstandings, it offers a great deal to readers at
every level of expertise. This sweeping
history provides the reader with great
insights into World War II in particular
but also into enduring issues, including
relationships between military,
political, and economic power.
BRENT BOSTON

Commander, U.S. Navy

Barritt, M. K. Eyes of the Admiralty: J. T. Serres—
an Artist in the Channel Fleet, 1799–1800. London: Hydrographic Office and National Maritime Museum, 2008. 144pp. $39.95

For centuries, the port of Brest in
northwestern France has been the chief
naval base and dockyard for French naval operations in the North Atlantic and
the Channel. For Britain, during the
Napoleonic Wars—as well as in all the
maritime wars between Britain and
France in 1689 and 1815—the French
Brest squadron was a central threat to
the Royal Navy. British naval strategy to
counter this threat had a number of elements. The Royal Navy’s Channel
Squadron had, as a primary duty, the
blockade of Brest. These operations
served the strategic function of deterring the Brest squadron from leaving
port and, thereby, of preventing it from
launching an invasion force against
Britain or its overseas possessions, attacking the British fleet, or interfering
with British warships and merchant
convoys that were using the nearby
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sea-lanes en route to various other parts
of the world. Given the central importance of dealing with the French naval
threat, British naval activities off Brest
are important in naval history and, not
surprisingly, they feature too in the
widely read historical naval novels that
are set in the period of the naval wars of
the French Revolution and Napoleon.
This volume is about a British naval intelligence operation off Brest in 1799–
1800. The story begins at a critical moment. The Second Coalition against
France had just been formed in June
1799, and in December Napoleon was
making his way back from Egypt to
overthrow the Directory and to make
himself First Consul. In London, halfway
between those events in September 1799,
the First Secretary of the Admiralty,
Evan Nepean, found that nothing available in any government office in London
provided a detailed visual image of Brest
that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord St.
Vincent, could use to understand the operational challenges or opportunities
that the port presented. To fill this gap in
British naval intelligence, Nepean ordered John Thomas Serres to report immediately to a frigate with the inshore
squadron on blockading duty to paint a
series of views of Brest and the nearby
coast of Brittany.
John Thomas Serres (1759–1825) was
the son of Dominic Serres (1719–93), a
French merchant seaman, who had
been captured in 1748 and brought to
England. Making his hobby of drawing
and painting into a lucrative new career, the elder Serres had become one of
the founders of the Royal Society of Art.
His evocative and highly accurate depictions of naval battles during the War
of the American Revolution had
brought him wide praise and, at the
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very end of his life, in 1791, the title of
Marine Painter to King George III. On
his death two years later, his son, John
Thomas Serres, who was already Master
Draughtsman to the Admiralty,
inherited his father’s position.
Serres’s beautiful and informative
sketches and paintings from this important mission have lain long unnoticed
by naval historians at the archives of
Britain’s Hydrographic Office in Taunton, Devon. Captain Michael K. Barritt,
Royal Navy (retired), has now brought
them to light in a beautifully produced
volume that is accompanied by Barritt’s
well researched, skillfully written, and
informative history of Serres’s mission.
Barritt first came to learn of this material when in 2003 he retired after
thirty-three years of naval service, having risen to become Hydrographer of
the Royal Navy. Fascinated by a framed
image from this series that he received
as a retirement gift, he set out on a research quest to understand more about
it. This book is the result of that research, which is informed by his naval
career and professional hydrographic
expertise as well as by his undergraduate education in history under Piers
Mackesy at Pembroke College, Oxford.
The story that Barritt tells in this volume is a valuable contribution to naval
history, one that directly complements
the documents in the Navy Records Society’s volume edited by Roger Morriss,
The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of
Brest, 1793–1801 (vol. 141, 2001). At the
same time, Barritt describes in this
beautifully illustrated volume a naval
mission that is full of action and interest for both the general reader and the
naval professional.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College

14

